An earlier version of this article is published in “The Spiral of Conflict and Violence in Indonesia”, IDF Indonesia Information, Bulletin on current developments in Indonesia, no.3, January 14, 1999, International Dialogues Foundation, The Hague, The Netherlands.
https://www.academia.edu/2650623/Gus_Durs_Painful_Dilemma_Political_Islam_in_Transition_1999_
On the eve of the Year of the Rabbit, 1999, a political game failed to hit its targets. Like rabbit, the chairman of Nadhatul Ulama, Indonesia’s biggest Moslem organisation, Abdur-rachman Wahid, better known as Gus Dur, suddenly took a surprising move. He met with former Indonesian dictator Soeharto and invited him to participate in a dialogue to resolve the political crises. Soeharto, Gus Dur argues, should be involved in discussions with President B.J. Habibie, the ABRI (military) commander Gen. Wiranto and Gus Dur him-self, because Soeharto is still a very influential political factor. Soeharto and Wiranto agreed, but Habibie flatly rejected the idea. Two weeks later, on January 7, Gus Dur conceded his failure. He regretted Habibie’s rejection and the negative public responses.
Gus Dur’s rabbit’s leap forward – essentially a move to corner Soeharto and weaken Habibie – thus failed to materialise. Instead he met great public anger and confusion. But, was his game without effects? Why should the popular leader of the country’s biggest Moslem organisation engage in a dangerous game by inviting the disgraced ex president Soeharto to rejoin the political arena after years of hardship and struggle to fight against his regime?
Social Burden
Gus Dur’s actions should be understood as part of the problems of political Islam in transition. Political Islam i.e. groups and politicians representing Moslem interests, is a key factor in Indonesian politics. It consists of two main groups, the ‘traditionalist’ Nadhatul Ulama (N.U.) and the ‘modernist’ Mohammadiyah, each with strong social bases, 20 to 30 millions of supporters, but very different sorts of constituencies. The N.U. main pillars are religious schools in small towns and villages, whilst Mohammadiyah focusses on urban, better educated, and economically better off, but more fragmented Moslem communities and individuals. Both are historic communities with
self-confidence leaders, but their differences are increasingly more relevant. N.U. is open and moderate toward the State but above all inward looking and strongly adheres to local traditions. Mohammadiyah, in contrast, tends to adhere to Islamic script and canons, but is socially more dynamic and modern, with strong, often rebellious, political motivation. Indeed the rivalry made N.U. politically accommodative as Mohammadiyah relation to the State tends to be problematic.
The Dutch rule and Soekarno regime had encouraged these tendencies, but it is Soeharto’s New Order, which has made greatest impacts. In a democracy, a strong electoral potential would easily result in a victory and an effective government of the party, but under Soeharto’s military rule exactly the reverse happened as a result of repressive mechanism to frustrate all mass based organisations. It is the strength of Gus Dur’s N.U. to have a mass support based on traditional loyalty, but, at the same time, it becomes a weakness for any leader to have a political base like N.U. since he inevitably has to depend too much on the very traditional, i.e. ‘backward’, structures of his communities. For to promote the welfare of its communities by providing greater economic and educational access, N.U. has to turn to the State. It would need long-term programs to shape a modern N.U. force as a community of religion and community of citizens, which are both socially influential and politically effective. N.U. is a great potential, but its leaders are bound to be captives of a great social burden.
Gus Dur, incidentally, is both typical and unique for N.U. He is typical in the way he acquires a mass support and being caught in such problems, but also unique because he is modern and liberal. He is a legitimate N.U. leader – in the full sense of the word, because his father and grandfather were both N.U. religious patrons and national figures – and a modern politician.
Soeharto’s New Order has introduced greater repression and greater welfare with contrasting impacts for different Moslem groups. The bloody extermination of the left in 1965-66 left Indonesia with only Moslem and nationalist mass based political groupings. As the civil society potentials are weak and repressed, N.U. becomes the strongest mass based force, but one without effective civilian partners because Mohammadiyah remains its traditional rival and the nationalists were forced to realign to suit the New Order’s political architecture. In the fifties, the Moslem modernists’ dream to introduce a reference to the Islamic Syari’ah law into the constitution failed and further attempts in that spirit were frustrated despite the fact that their political party, Masyumi, ranked second. But, under Soeharto, even attempts to revive Masyumi were blocked. As a result, the modernists continued to act rather strange and awkwardly – if not paranoid. The late Prof. W.F. Wertheim refered to this when he said that Islam in Indonesia is “a majority with minority mentality”.
But if the modernists’ aspirations could only be dimly expressed through Soeharto State’s tailored political parties, the fate of N.U. was worse. Despite the great help the N.U. youth provided the army in the massacre of the left in mid sixties, N.U, being a big movement, became the second great victim of the New Order. N.U. was the first target of repression and had to suffer during the unfair elections of 1971 and 1977. The government party, Golkar’s ‘politics of bulldozer’ purged many N.U. leaders from the national politics, creating a painful and traumatic experience for N.U.
Soeharto’s rule has thus strongly forced N.U. to be more accommodative, loyal, even subservient to the interests of the State. Only an energetic, clever, and witty political game, played by Gus Dur, could save N.U. from humiliation and disintegration and provide some security for N.U. communities. Indeed, in 1984, even Gus Dur was forced to dismantle N.U. as a political party and prepare N.U. masses for a long-term political development; Gus Dur himself even became a Golkar MP for sometime. These structural constraints basically had resulted in a “love and hate” relationship between Gus Dur’s N.U. and the State (i.e. the president, ABRI and Golkar) simply, but fundamentally, because he had to maintain a good relation only in order to survive and gain some progress. It was not without great risks, though. Throughout the nineties, Soeharto’s men had unsuccesfully tried two times to topple Gus Dur from N.U. leadership; there were even reports of State terrors by car accidents.
Growing Gap
Already from the very beginning, Soeharto had effected a great trauma for the political Islam as a whole. From early sixties on, in effect, some generals have changed the political map by, first, subverting Soekarno’s policies and exterminating the political left, then creating a strong State and a new political structure to support the so-called “twenty-five years program of accelerated development”, and, finally, trying to crush the political Islam. With ‘a little help from (his) friends’, the Dutch priest J. Beek and Gen. Benny Moerdani, Gen. Ali Moertopo, the greatest strategist of Soeharto’s New Order, achieved a great deal. In a time when Islamic radicalism gained momentum following the victory of the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979, Moertopo’s repressive policy of Islam-phobia consequently victimised many and resulted in deep trauma. Any activism of Moslem politicians was stigmatised as “Komando Jihad” or “Darul Islam”, rendering them politically discredited and illegitimate.
But the New Order’s economic successes of the seventies and eighties later turned against Moertopo’s achievements. Thanks to Soeharto and Moertopo, the traditional rivalry between N.U. and Mohammadiyah is transformed into an almost antagonistic relation. Islam in Indonesia, the modernists used to say, “is lagging behind because N.U. traditionalists are backward and accept the status quo”. At social level, the modernists resented what they called “non Moslem domination” in public life, claiming that they, being a majority group, were not proportionally sharing, even “unfairly discriminated” in public opinion -, decision making and educational spheres. With the rise of new middle classes, created by the New Order, the modernists, including many who were hurt by Moertopo’s Islam-phobia, started to demand a power sharing, leaving Gus Dur and N.U. behind. It was these pressures from the society as well as Soeharto’s opportunism, as Prof. Mitsuo Nakamura has in effect argued, that made the president in early ninety turned to Islam and the Moslems modernist by creating ICMI, Association of Moslem Intellectuals.
As the modernists accepted the New Order’s political structure and enjoyed the fruits of economic growth, Gus Dur, relying on N.U. mass supports, tried to control the political Islam, by playing rabbit-like games (evading, confronting and approaching) with the president and the ABRI leaders, and isolating the modernist dominated PPP and ICMI. ‘Facing big enemies (i.e. the president and ABRI), you better joint and hit them from inside’ seemed to be Gus Dur’s device. He even went so far as to ally with Gen. Benny Moerdani shortly after the latter led the brutal killings of Moslem radicals in Tanjung Priok in 1984. Given his credentials, Gus Dur could afford such a bold step vis a vis his N.U. supporters, secular pro democratic movements and minority groups, but it left the impression as if he condoned the massacre, which in turn established Gus Dur’s image among the modernists. In fact, Gus Dur’s N.U. only ‘joined, but could rarely hit the State’, it was even hit bloodily.
As a result, the gap between Gus Dur’s N.U. and the modernists grew – which became even stronger as a result of uncritical support for Gus Dur by liberal intellectuals, pro-democratic (non government organisations and student masses) and religious minority groups in isolating ICMI per se, although the latter included many liberal minded intellectuals. Indeed, the pro-democratic forces did not even attempt to approach ICMI-liberals (as may be expected in order to forge an alliance against
Soeharto regime), but it was Soeharto who created a split within ICMI when he victimised two ICMI founders, Amien Rais and Sri Bintang Pamungkas.
‘Real Green’?
Meanwhile the political Islam also changed ideologically. No longer are the Indonesian Moslems “majority with minority mentality”, but they shifted into a new, more colourful phase. Political Islam is now searching for a new form and direction in its relationship to State and society. As the discussions since mid-seventies indicated, N.U. formulates its mission as “Indonesianising Islam”, whereas the Moslem modernists perceive the issue as problems of “Islamising Indonesia”. If N.U. sees it as part of ‘nation building’, some radicals among the modernists tend to see it as problems of conquering, ideologising and spiritualising the State and society. To put it in simple terms, at issue would seem to be ‘Nation-State’ versus ‘Islamic State’.
But, contrary to much Western media obsession, rather than a matter of Moslem “fundamentalists” waiting at the doorstep of State power, the conflict really resolves around symbols, form and power. It is true, Islamic identity becomes a public obsession, Islamic clothing popular and Islamic rituals better observed, but Indonesian Islam remains generally easy going – a far cry from Saudi type of rigid Islamic practice. At intellectual level, the discourse even tends toward (Gus Dur type of) ‘Indonesianising Islam’, but with a lot of thoughts and nuances emphasizing the need to strengthen Islamic values and spirits – another far cry from Masjumi’s or radicals’ dream of establishing an “Islamic State”. This trend is popularised by ICMI moderates and represented by religious leaders and liberal intellectuals like Nurcholisch Madjid (“Islam Yes, Islamic Party No!”), Emha A. Najib, Emil Salim and many others.
Soeharto, meanwhile, continued his policy of anti mass based organisations to strengthen his State control. Instead of manipulating minority figures and hooligans against much of political Islam (as Moertopo did in the seventies) or secular and Moslem moderates against Moslem radicals (Moerdani in the eighties), Soeharto turned the table around and ignored the religious minorities and poured resources to tame the Moslem modernists into ICMI and, more importantly, to shape a new ABRI. Consequently, ICMI, an elitist modernist club to collect Moslem intellectuals, became a channel for the political ambitions of Moslem modernist middle classes. The ABRI-top, likewise, became so-called “ijo royo-royo” (real green), meaning “pro Islam” (read: pro modernists). Strategic public and military positions, at least, should be de-Christianised and dominated by Soeharto loyalists and Islamic officers. With Golkar dominating State resources, ICMI not only tried to usurp the government party, but also prepared itself for post-Soeharto era and made minister and later Vice President B.J. Habibie its symbolic leader.
Indeed, it was neither the ABRI-top nor the Golkar leaders, let alone the opposition, but the ICMI leaders who were ready to take over the government when Soeharto fell. Only two hours after Soeharto resigned, on May 21 last year, the Mohammadiyah headquarter in Jakarta was in euphoria and a special meeting was held there between ICMI prominents (Adi Sasono etc) and Amien Rais apparently to prepare for the first Habibie cabinet. Two months later, they took over Golkar’s leadership, abruptly sidelining a group of generals and intellectuals.
“Extreme Right”
Gus Dur consistently opposed – “acting as a bumper,” some observers said, against – sectarianism and State’s fascistic practices. But as ICMI, under Soeharto, became an opportunistic partner and ABRI a personal instrument of the president, a split within the power centres became inevitable. As the ABRI-top is divided into ‘red-white’ (nationalist) versus ‘real green’ or ‘pro Islam’ camps, the decisive moment came, it seems, when the new ABRI commander Gen. Feisal Tanjung, after earlier refusals by his two predecessors (Gen. Try Soetrisno and Gen. Edi Sudradjat), agreed in 1993 to do the so-called “Soeharto’s project” (the term significantly came from inside ABRI c.q. Gen. Hasnan Habib) to launch the Islamisation of the ABRI top. It is at this period, that Gus Dur began to seriously worry about the direction of State and society – in particular that of the political Islam – and started to talk about “the danger of the extreme right wing”. For this, in his view, would turn his mission of “Indonesianising Islam” into “Islamising Indonesia” at a time, ironically, when the popularity and acceptance of the latter’s message are increasingly doubtful.
“Extreme right wingers are everywhere, in the cabinet, ABRI, Golkar and in many political parties,” Gus Dur warned the public recently. Although there are doubts as to the extent to which his perception of “the danger of the extreme right wing” is correct, his worries are generally justified. With Habibie ascend into presidency, the cycle of political violence continues unabated. A trend of bloody ethnic and religious cleansing, starting from Situbondo, Tasikmalaya and Sanggau Ledo in 1996-97, is repeated under Habibie-Wiranto, in Jakarta (the May riots and the Ketapang case), Banyuwangi and Kupang. More than 500 churches were reportedly destroyed in less than three years only, from 1996 untill today – a very sharp contrast to less than five similar cases within a time span of more than half century, 1945-1996 (including the five years of physical struggle after the indepen-dence proclamation). No doubt, most of these riots are politically motivated and many of them (Situbondo 1996 and Banyuwangi 1998 to mention but few) are specifically directed against N.U. local bases.
The point is the real chance to win the elections of Gus Dur’s party, the PKB, in alliance with Megawati’s PDI and supported by others, including probably Wiranto’s ABRI and ex generals led PKP, may have become a daunting spectre for many would-be-contestants of June 1999 general elections. With Amien Rais, supported by some liberals, leaving the political Islam in order to lead his party, PAN, the ICMI dominated Golkar and Islamic parties like PPP and PBB – may be afraid of losing ground and turn to Soeharto to intimidate Gus Dur’s supporters.
So, as far as Gus Dur is concerned, nothing has changed from Soeharto to Habibie. He, therefore, explicitly pointed to the key influence of Soeharto and his men both in and outside Habibie and Wiranto power circles. They may endanger the fate of political Islam and the future of the country. With such “extremists” in power, a social revolution may be inevitable, he reasoned, “that’s why we should involve Soeharto in a national dialogue”.
To return to Gus Dur’s failed rabbit game: he apparently hoped that the dialogue would greatly reduce Soeharto’s influence, seriously weaken Habibie and Golkar (the party now dominated by Habibie’s men) and strengthen Gen. Wiranto and ABRI’s support for Gus Dur’s party, the PKB. This would, of course, also make Gus Dur’s own position stronger. In this way, he hopes to contribute toward a better political climate which could suppress the sources of political violence, thus providing a better condition for the general elections in June, which will be crucial for Indonesia’s near future. The elections and the ending the cycle of violence against the opposition and the minorities will be crucial to restore the international confidence.
Although the dialogue did not take place, Gus Dur might have partly achieved what he aimed at i.e. associating Soeharto with dirty politics of violence and, by implication, may also have weaken Habibie’s men. Subsequently the issue of possible connections of Soeharto and State terror were raised in the public opinion. Significantly, few days after Habibie rejected the dialogue, Gen. Wiranto started to purge some “pro Islam” officers and consolidate his “red-white” group. Indonesian press reports suggested that the ABRI top had internally suffered much from sectarian game, with the leading weekly Tempo questioning the issue of “Islamic State”.
A lot of things remain, but many have changed since Soeharto fell. ‘Democratic space’ has grown considerably as State hegemony, as a result of the ongoing economic and political crises, diminishes to an unprecedented weakness to the benefit of a greater space for various movements from the society. Gus Dur needs to appreciate this historic momentum. Under such conditions, he should widen his social bases to urban masses and to the grass roots level outside his N.U. But, given his ill health and ending term of office as N.U. general chairman soon, he may run out of time. Conversely, others, including pro-democratic, student movements and minority groups should appreciate and be able to take lessons from political Islam’s – in particular Gus Dur’s – painful experience under Soeharto’s New Order consequent anti democratic policies.
